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Debate over the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) ranges over three quite different 
domains of enquiry. Protagonists are committed to substantive positions regarding (i) 
empirical questions concerning (for example) the properties and prevalence of systems of 
epigenetic inheritance; (ii) historical characterisations of the modern synthesis and; (iii) 
conceptual/philosophical matters concerning (among other things) the nature of 
evolutionary processes, and the relationship between selection and adaptation. With these 
different aspects of the debate in view, it is possible to demonstrate the range of cross-
cutting positions on offer when well-informed evolutionists consider their stance on the 
EES. This overview of the multiple dimensions of debate also enables clarification of two 
philosophical elements of the EES debate, regarding the status of niche-construction and 
the role of selection in explaining adaptation. Finally, it points the way to a possible 
resolution of the EES debate, via a pragmatic approach to evolutionary enquiry.  
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1. The Levels of Extension 
 
This article attempts to clarify what is at stake in the debate over the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis (EES).1 Laland et al (2014: 161-2) are convinced that, ‘the EES will shed new light 
on how evolution works’. In response, Wray et al (2014: 164) insist that, ‘We, too, want an 
extended evolutionary synthesis, but for us, these words are lowercase because this is how 
the field has always advanced.’ Everyone agrees that extensions—of some kind, at least—to 
current evolutionary understanding will be illuminating. Everyone agrees on the value of the 
approaches to evolutionary study that have gone before. Each side nonetheless regards the 
other as deeply mistaken. Some exchanges have been full of suspicion regarding the 
motives of those holding opposing views (Gupta et al 2017, Feldman et al 2017). A  
newcomer to this mêlée—even if well-versed in the facts of evolution—may wonder what 
the fuss is about. It had better concern more than a preference for capital letters.  
 
EES enthusiasts tend to recommend revised approaches to such diverse biological 
phenomena as inheritance, adaptation and development. I argue that the debate goes 
much further. The main protagonists are committed to substantive historical views 
regarding the nature of evolutionary theory from the late 1910s onwards; the flexibility of 
the investigative and explanatory tools that have been developed by evolutionary biologists; 
and the openness of research communities to novel approaches. They take stands on 
conceptual and philosophical questions concerning (among other things) what an 
evolutionary process is, the nature of biological causation, and how adaptation should be 
                                                        
1 See Pigliucci and Müller (2010) for an important early exploration of this debate. 
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explained. Finally, the groups discussing the EES differ on straightforward empirical 
questions relating to such things as the properties of epigenetic inheritance systems. In 
other words, we can discern disputes over three analytical domains: the historical, the 
conceptual/philosophical and the empirical. 
 
The factional nature of this debate invites evolutionists either to support the EES or to 
oppose it. The diversity of broad themes and sub-topics under discussion suggests, 
however, that thoughtful researchers are unlikely to fall into two neat camps. We should 
expect cross-cutting verdicts regarding (for example) the significance of epigenetic 
inheritance, the constraining nature of the modern synthesis (MS), the proper 
characterisation of evolutionary processes, and the role of selection in explaining 
adaptation. 
 
The primary goal of this paper, then, is to demonstrate how many distinct disputes are 
being conducted under the umbrella of the EES debate. It is not possible in a single article to 
come to detailed verdicts regarding them all. This taxonomy of disputes is useful all the 
same, because the first step to resolving argument over the EES is to understand what the 
debate is about. The article moves on to focus on conceptual aspects of the disputes over 
niche-construction and adaptation, understood as exemplars for the wider debate. In 
particular, it offers a deflationary resolution of the dispute over whether niche-construction 
is an evolutionary ‘process’. Finally, it uses the question of what success for the extenders 
would consist in to sketch a potential resolution of the EES debate that should be 
acceptable to all camps. 
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2. Radicals versus Accretionists 
 
EES advocates call for change. What sort of changes are these, how radical are they 
intended to be, and what are they changes to? 
 
The phrase ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’ might seem to imply that the changes are 
envisaged as simple extensions of, or supplements to, an evolutionary synthesis whose core 
can remain intact. In fact, proponents of the EES usually aim for profound revisions that 
cannot be understood as simple progress by accretion. For this reason I refer to EES 
enthusiasts as ‘radicals’. They have repeatedly resisted being labelled as ‘revolutionaries’, 
and in using the term ‘radicals’ I mean to imply neither that they believe change should be 
very rapid, nor that they all advocate reform of the entire evolutionary community, only 
that the changes they would like to see run deep. 
 
EES defenders maintain that enormous achievements have been made via evolutionary 
approaches formulated in the broad style of Fisher, Wright, Dobzhansky, Maynard Smith, 
Hamilton and many others from the 1920s onwards. Even so, they believe that an evidential 
and conceptual case has been accumulating for significant revisions to the orienting 
framework inherited from such theorists. The EES, ‘is not just an extension of the MS but a 
distinctively different framework for understanding evolution…’ (Laland et al 2015: 3). 
 
Different EES advocates give different emphases regarding how disruptive the proposed 
changes will be. Laland (2018) explains that he knows, ‘of no biologist who wants to rip up 
the textbooks, or throw out natural selection’. The EES is meant to consist in continuous, 
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not revolutionary, change with respect to the modern synthesis: ‘what is going on is 
“normal science”.’ Moreover, Laland stresses the insights that will emerge if some biologists 
work under the guidance of an extended synthesis. He does not argue that all others should 
cease to work within a more traditional perspective. Thus he advocates a form of parallel-
track pluralism, which gives explicit credit to the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, in 
preference to the picture of revolutionary paradigm shifts advocated by Thomas Kuhn 
(Fábregas-Tejeda and Vergara-Silva 2018). There are radical elements to his proposals all the 
same, because in seeking a broader understanding of ‘the causes of evolution’, he believes 
this ‘changes how we think about the process as a whole’ (Laland 2018). 
 
Müller places less stress on pluralism. He argues that the accumulation of new evidence and 
theory about a range of sub-topics such as epigenetic inheritance, developmental plasticity, 
and the origins of adaptive novelties brings with it a basic conceptual re-orientation of 
evolutionary theory’s core. As he explains, ‘The term “EES” used here and elsewhere…is not 
meant as a simple extension of the MS, as is sometimes wrongly implied, but to indicate a 
comprehensive new synthesis’ (2017: 8). Müller is not calling for well-known textbooks to 
be ripped up, but it does seem that he would like to see those textbooks subject to 
significant restructuring. 
 
The EES’s opponents have objected to these calls for basic change in underlying theoretical 
orientation. I refer to them as ‘accretionists’. The likes of Wray et al (2014) and Futuyma 
(2017) do not believe that evolutionary theory should remain static in all respects. However, 
they anticipate that evolutionary biology will progress via elaborations of underlying 
theoretical and explanatory structures that have long been entrenched in evolutionary 
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theory. They see no need at present for what we might think of as fundamental reforms to 
these basic structures.2  
 
3. From Empirical to Historical Questions 
 
Empirical controversies in the EES 
 
It hardly needs stating that some disputes between radicals and accretionists concern 
empirical matters. To pick just one example, Charlesworth et al (2017) have countered the 
radicals regarding the evolutionary significance of non-genetic forms of inheritance. Part of 
their case rests on their view that there is little evidence of the relevant forms of non-
genetic transmission being widespread in nature. They acknowledge that small-interfering 
RNAs may constitute a non-nuclear means whereby adaptive traits acquired in response to 
an environmental challenge can be passed to subsequent generations. Moreover, they cite 
cytoplasmic inheritance of infection resistance in C. elegans, mediated via such small-
interfering RNAs, as an empirically plausible example of such inheritance. Yet they caution 
that, ‘it remains to be determined how frequently such processes occur in nature’ (4). Their 
general contention, then, is that a good empirical case for the widespread operation of non-
genetic forms of inheritance is still lacking. Meanwhile, the radicals come to a quite 
different assessment of the evidence (Laland et al 2015; see also Jablonka and Lamb 2014 
                                                        
2 See Love (2017) for different understandings of what the ‘structure’ of our biological 
knowledge might amount to. 
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for a thorough survey of forms of non-genetic inheritance from the perspective of 
researchers highly sympathetic to the EES).3 
 
This debate remains open: recent reviews on the significance of non-genetic inheritance 
have come to a range of conclusions from scepticism (Otterdijk and Michels 2016) to 
optimism (Bohacek and Mansuy 2015) via various more guarded approaches. Miska and 
Ferguson-Smith (2016), for example, note that while there is a clear case for non-genetic 
inheritance in many plant and animal organisms, ‘In mammals, the molecular mechanisms 
have been challenging to elucidate’ (2016: 59). Gapp and Bohacek (2017: 1) remark that 
even for mammals, ‘While [the] concept of epigenetic germline inheritance has long been 
met with skepticism, evidence in support of this route of information transfer is now 
overwhelming, and some key mechanisms underlying germline transmission of acquired 
information are emerging’. Sometimes, then, disputes between radicals and accretionists 
look to first-order empirical questions, and the debate is likely to be clarified as further 
evidence accumulates. But EES debates do not stop with such empirical questions, as we 
will now see. 
 
The historical legacy of the Modern Synthesis 
 
                                                        
3 An early example of experimental work on non-genetic inheritance comes from Beisson 
and Sonneborn (1965). Their work is reviewed under the category of ‘structural inheritance’ 
by Jablonka and Lamb (2014). 
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The conceptual topics discussed by EES protagonists are comparatively well known, and 
some of their major themes will be explored in section four and beyond. It is perhaps less 
obvious that EES debates also concern historical questions, as this section establishes.4 
 
In order to show the need for revisions to the evolutionary mainstream, EES advocates must 
achieve two distinct tasks. A conceptual and empirical case has to be made for the nature of 
the evolutionary processes that require a new synthesis. A historical case also needs to be 
made for the character of the discipline in need of revision. For suppose it turns out that the 
discipline of evolutionary biology as a whole is already poised to accept the full significance 
of phenomena such as epigenetic inheritance or niche construction. Suppose, further, that it 
already possesses many of the tools required to understand these processes, and that any 
new tools it may need can be fashioned via slight modifications to mainstream techniques 
for modelling, empirical investigation and so forth. While emergent empirical evidence 
might provoke increasing recognition of how widespread such phenomena are, no 
reworking of basic frameworks will be required. 
 
This is why major statements of the EES—and major efforts to rebut them—begin with 
lengthy historical characterisations of evolutionary biology. Laland et al (2014: 164), for 
example, claim that, ‘The core of the current evolutionary theory was forged in the 1930s 
and 1940s’. They describe this core in terms of ‘tenets’, ‘assumptions’, or the ‘story that 
                                                        
4 Explicit recognition of the historical controversies that are implicated in the EES comes 
from Minelli (2010), Love (2017), Fábregas-Tejeda and Vergara-Silva (2018), Baedke (2018) 
and Griesemer (2019). 
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[standard evolutionary theory] tells’: new variation is a consequence of random genetic 
mutation, inheritance is a matter of the passing on of DNA, natural selection is the sole 
cause of adaptation. There is a similar characterisation in Laland et al’s (2015) more detailed 
presentation: the Modern Synthesis ‘has provided the dominant conceptual framework for 
evolutionary biology’, and this framework consists, again, in a series of ‘assumptions’ (1-2). 
In other words, the framework should be understood in terms of a series of general 
assertions or hypotheses about evolutionary processes. 
 
There are three important elements to this broad historical characterisation: first, it is 
possible to pin down a fairly well characterised episode in the 30s and 40s in which a 
synthetic approach to evolution was forged; second, this ‘Modern Synthesis’ is best 
understood as a series of assumptions about the general nature of evolutionary processes; 
third, these same assumptions have continued to provide the core of evolutionary biology 
up to the present day.  
 
Accretionists sometimes agree with all three aspects of the radicals’ historical picture. 
Charlesworth et al (2017: 1) claim that the ‘basic ideas’ of the modern synthesis ‘remain 
central to contemporary biology, despite enormous advances over the past 80 years...’. 
They, too, think that the MS should be characterised in terms of tenets elaborated in the 
30s and 40s and maintained ever since. Their particular concern is to show that all is well 
with the claim that, ‘adaptive evolution is due to natural selection acting on heritable 
variability that originates through accidental changes in the genetic material’ (1). Here the 
accretionists endorse the radicals’ historical claim that modern evolutionary theory has 
inherited, more or less intact, a group of general organising claims about nature that were 
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first formed eighty years ago. Disagreement instead concerns whether these claims are 
accurate. 
 
It is possible, however, to detect an additional line of debate that concerns the radicals’ 
characterisation of history. Wray et al (2014: 163) assert that since the 30s and 40s, 
‘generations of evolutionary biologists have modified, corrected and extended the 
framework of the modern synthesis in countless ways’. Their view is that, ‘What Laland and 
colleagues term the standard evolutionary theory is a caricature that views the field as static 
and monolithic…’.5 In assessing this historical aspect of debate it is important to keep in 
mind an important distinction between the general claims we make about evolutionary 
processes—the assumptions, tenets or hypotheses enumerated by radicals and accretionists 
alike—and the tools we use to investigate nature. 
 
Evolutionary Assumptions and Evolutionary Tools 
 
One of the radicals’ most often-repeated claims concerns the need to integrate various 
forms of non-genetic inheritance into the study of evolution. Helanterä and Uller (2010), for 
example, adopt an expanded version of the Price Equation to explore the evolutionary 
significance of a variety of forms of inheritance—including horizontal gene transfer and 
various forms of epigenetic inheritance—that clearly were not envisaged by the architects 
of the Modern Synthesis. Suppose, then, that we understand the Modern Synthesis as a set 
of general assumptions or hypotheses about evolutionary processes. To the extent that 
                                                        
5 Futuyma (2017: 1) makes a similar remark. 
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Helanterä and Uller succeed in demonstrating the evolutionary importance of forms of 
inheritance that are at odds with the gene-focused claims of MS, then they also succeed in 
justifying their call for ‘extending the Modern Synthesis view of genetic inheritance’ (2010: 
2). 
 
Remember, though, that they use an adapted version of the Price Equation (owing to Frank 
[1997]) to ground their claims. This underlines the fact that evolutionary thinkers have 
already developed—since the 1970s in the case of the Price Equation and its later 
modifications—well established tools to explore phenomena that were not anticipated in 
the 30s and 40s. Helanterä and Uller duly acknowledge that the phenomena they are 
interested in, ‘can be incorporated in the quantitative genetics framework’ (12). 
 
An ambiguity in Charlesworth et al’s (2017) attack on the radicals exemplifies this deeper 
division regarding how the evolutionary ‘mainstream’ is interpreted. For the most part they 
are concerned to deny that epigenetic inheritance systems can sustain processes of 
adaptation by natural selection. But occasionally their focus seems to be different: 
 
Combining modes of inheritance that differ in their mutation rates and transmission 
patterns can alter the outcome of selection in complex ways... However, this is not 
of fundamental significance as far as the general properties of evolutionary dynamics 
are concerned. (2017: 7) 
 
They seem to agree with radicals like Uller and Helanterä that interactions between systems 
of inheritance can alter outcomes of selection in ways that merit detailed investigation. 
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What, then, do they mean by simultaneously conceding the proposal that these influences 
might be ‘complex’, while also insisting that they are not of ‘fundamental significance’? They 
suggest that we should not lose sight of very general constraints on how natural selection 
explains the appearance of adaptation: however variation is inherited, the process of 
inheritance must be reasonably faithful and environments must be reasonably stable. The 
result, they say, is that the tools used for understanding evolution as it acts on genetic 
variation can also be used to understand evolution when it acts on other forms of inherited 
variation.6  
 
This underscores the difficulties in coming to any straightforward assessment of the EES 
debate. Someone who is convinced of the widespread action of non-genetic inheritance 
across numerous taxa may align themselves with the radicals when considering what 
difference these processes make to evolutionary outcomes. Alternatively, they may find 
themselves in alignment with the accretionists if they instead focus on the issue of whether 
mainstream evolutionary theory possesses the sorts of tools needed to explore these 
phenomena (Minelli 2010).7 
 
                                                        
6 See Lu and Bourrat (2018) for a similar defence of the traditional approach. 
7 Griesemer (2019) doubts whether there could ever be the sort of uncontested account of 
the Modern Synthesis itself that would enable us to decisively assess calls for ‘extensions’ to 
it. He cites Callebaut’s remark that ‘such debates can go on forever. If…the Synthesis has no 
essence, its extensions are negotiable’ (2010: 458). 
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This possibility is demonstrated by Bonduriansky and Day, whose (2018) Extended Heredity: 
A New Understanding of Inheritance and Evolution makes a detailed theoretical and 
empirical case for the evolutionary importance of various forms of non-genetic inheritance. 
They make use of the Price Equation to frame these questions. They are, however, sceptics 
regarding the EES (Bonduriansky et al 2018). In spite of championing an extended approach 
to inheritance—one of the themes stressed repeatedly by the radicals—Bonduriansky and 
Day have distanced themselves from the radicals’ cause. 
 
This phenomenon—whereby the very people whose research is, on the face of things, the 
most congenial to the radicals claims, nonetheless express neutrality or scepticism towards 
the EES—is not especially unusual. Brakefield and collaborators have done widely admired 
research on developmental bias, as explored through detailed empirical investigations of 
butterfly eyespots (e.g. Beldade et al 2002, see also Brakefield 2006). Developmental bias is 
another phenomenon repeatedly stressed by the EES radicals. They take it to undermine 
two assumptions that they link to the Modern Synthesis: first, that the variation presented 
to selection is ‘random’; second, that developmental processes cannot exert important 
influence on evolutionary trajectories. It is noteworthy that while Brakefield has very 
explicitly joined with some EES radicals in stressing the manner in which the study of bias 
can help inform a variety of important evolutionary questions regarding (for example) 
evolvability, macroevolutionary patterns, and so forth (Uller et al 2018), he has not yet gone 
so far as to endorse any more radical claims regarding the need for a fundamental 





It is time to take stock of the argument so far. The debate over the EES is in part a historical 
debate. It turns on whether we should construe the history of evolutionary theory in terms 
of a series of debates over hypotheses or assumptions regarding the nature of evolutionary 
processes; whether we should construe it in terms of the development and modification of 
various explanatory and experimental tools and techniques; or whether we should instead 
construe it in terms of the acceptance of scientists into growing communities of research.8 
Understanding this helps to explain why the EES debate has been hard to resolve: the 
question of how one assesses the radicals’ cause for reform depends on how one assesses 
the current and past status of the evolutionary ‘mainstream’ (Callebaut 2010). 
 
To the extent that one thinks of the mainstream as dominated by a set of assumptions that 
are now 80 years old, one is likely to join the radicals’ cause. The work of Bonduriansky and 
Day gives us good reason to challenge the notion that the genetic inheritance system is the 
only one that matters in the study of evolution. Brakefield’s work gives us good reason to 
think that evolutionary trajectories can be affected by the biases introduced by 
developmental processes into the range of available phenotypic variation. 
 
To the extent that one instead thinks of the mainstream as dominated by a malleable and 
growing set of tools for modelling and understanding various evolutionary problems, one is 
                                                        
8 The EES debate is illuminated by sociological work that compares the strategic role of 
christening the ‘Modern Synthesis’ movement with current efforts to form an EES 
community. See especially Fábregas-Tejeda and Vergara-Silva (2018) for further analysis. 
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more likely to be a sceptic. The fact that Brakefield’s work is widely respected indicates that 
mainstream evolutionary biology has already found some ways to pursue research on 
developmental bias, and gives us reason to anticipate it might be able to accommodate 
newer techniques that simulate the action of developmental mechanisms in silico (e.g. 
Salazar-Ciudad and Jernvall 2010). The work of Bonduriansky and Day gives us reason to 
think the Price equation will help us to understand non-genetic inheritance in ways that 
involve comparatively modest modifications to the frameworks already used for 
understanding genetic inheritance. This tool was not available to the early synthesis 
architects, but it has been in wide use for over thirty years, and it has been subject to 
modifications and refinements over this period. 
 
In response to both the examples treated in this section—extended inheritance and 
developmental bias—EES advocates will argue that we should not lose sight of their primary 
contention. Their view is not that these phenomena cannot be approached from the 
traditional perspective of the modern synthesis. Instead, their claim is that the MS imposes 
restrictive constraints on how we understand them (Laland et al 2015). Radicals argue that 
the MS encourages a conception of developmental bias as a negative constraint on 
selection: it can only explain the non-appearance of adaptive phenotypes we might 
otherwise anticipate. Instead, we should also ask how developmental biases facilitate the 
pursuit of adaptive pathways that would otherwise be closed off or harder to access (Uller 
et al 2018). Similarly, they argue that the MS encourages us to ask whether extended 
systems of inheritance might underpin the generation of adaptation in the same manner as 
genetic systems of inheritance. Yet advocates of the EES point to ways in which non-genetic 
inheritance can act to facilitate or constrain which evolutionary pathways are followed, 
 16 
even when selection continues to act on iterated cycles of genetic variation. These issues 
reappear in the final sections of this paper, which deal in more detail with the relation 
between selection and adaptation.  
 
4. Niche Construction and Evolutionary Processes 
 
The Causal Direction of Selection 
 
The philosophical and conceptual strands of the EES debate are nicely illustrated by EES 
radicals’ claims for niche construction. Müller, for example, recommends the inclusion of 
niche construction alongside natural selection as a basic revision to the modern synthesis 
(Müller 2017). He represents the theoretical structure of the modern synthesis using a 
diagram that features (among many other things) an arrow labelled ‘natural selection’ that 
moves from environment to organism. His depiction of the EES features an additional arrow, 
labelled ‘niche construction’, that moves from organism to environment. 
 
This way of representing one of the recommended transformations to the dominant 
framework has intuitive appeal. It is tempting to think of natural selection as a force exerted 
by the environment on organisms, as when avian predators are credited with causal 
responsibility for reshaping a population of peppered moths. Some may be equally tempted 
to think that fully understanding the causal fit between moths and their environment 
requires that we take into account a further process, whereby moths choose where to 
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reside. Thorpe made this argument in the 1960s, in ways that anticipate many of the EES 
advocates’ concerns (e.g. Uller and Helanterä 2018): 9 
 
…before an organism’s environment can exert natural selection on it, the organism 
must select the environment to live in.  That is, there is a feedback or cybernetic 
system in which there is nothing that is simply cause and simply effect.  It is useless 
for melanistic moths in industrial areas to become darker unless they choose the 
dark patches to sit on, which in fact they do. (Thorpe 1965: 15-16) 
 
This way of presenting things encourages the proposal that selection needs to be 
supplemented by an additional causal process that also explains adaptation, yet which runs 
in the opposite direction. This way of thinking about selection—and, correlatively, about 
how an appeal to niche construction augments the modern synthesis—may be intuitive, but 
it faces significant conceptual objections. Selection is not best understood as a directional 
force exerted by environments on organisms. 
 
Exactly how natural selection should be understood is contentious (Sober 1984, Walsh et al 
2002, Reisman and Forber 2005, inter alia). It is comparatively uncontroversial to identify 
selection with the existence in a population of fitness differences (Sober 1984). That is to 
say, selection is present whenever there are differences in the expected reproductive 
outputs of the variants present in the population. The strength of selection can then be 
quantified according to the degree of variance in fitness (Fisher 1930). 
                                                        
9 Radick (2017) analyses Thorpe’s work in detail. 
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The differences in expected reproductive outputs that constitute selection are always the 
upshot of mutual causal interactions between organisms and their environments. Consider 
a mutation that causes a metabolic change, which in turn means that an organism reaches 
reproductive age more quickly than others in the population. This may confer a fitness 
advantage. Selection arises here from interactions between developmental processes and 
the social environment: there is no need for us to find an environmental force to identify 
with selection, and it would be difficult to know which environmental force we should pick. 
Even so, we are dealing here with an instance of ‘selection’ in an entirely mainstream sense 
of the term.  
 
For another example, suppose that males with longer tails are more attractive to females 
than males with shorter tails. The result is that females are more likely to allow mating 
opportunities to these longer-tailed males. Selection for tail length is at work here in a 
manner that can be represented in mainstream evolutionary frameworks. It would be a 
mistake, however, to claim that selection consists in a directional causal force that runs 
from environment to organism, rather than a force running from organism to environment. 
The greater fitness of the longer-tailed variant is the result of causal interactions between 
male anatomy, female perceptual systems, and mating behaviours. Formal approaches to 
selection are neutral concerning whether fitness differences arise from effects of 
environments on organisms, organisms on environments, or reciprocal interactions 
between the two. 
 
The Productivity of Niche Construction 
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Accretionists do not usually criticise radicals by highlighting problems inherent in the 
directional causal conception of selection. Instead they point out that a recognition of how 
organisms alter their environments, and the development of tools to help understand such 
phenomena, are about as old as the MS itself. Odling-Smee et al (2003) define niche 
construction as ‘the process whereby organisms…modify their own and/or each other’s 
niches’. A niche, in turn, is the ‘sum of all the natural selection pressures to which the 
population is exposed’ (2003: 419). Frequency-dependent selection and sexual selection are 
consequently instances of niche-construction. They are phenomena widely acknowledged to 
result in characteristic evolutionary dynamics. For example, sexual selection can explain 
‘runaway’ phenomena, and phenomena that would otherwise appear plainly maladaptive. 
They are also phenomena for which explanatory mathematical machinery has long been 
available. The upshot, say accretionists, is that while niche-construction is undeniably 
important, no revision is needed if we are to take it into account (Wray et al 2014, Scott-
Philipps et al 2014). 
 
Niche-construction enthusiasts give two complementary responses to accretionists’ 
scepticism. One draws on the heuristic value of the niche construction perspective, the 
other advocates a deeper reconfiguration of how evolutionary processes should be 
understood.  
 
The Heuristic Defence of Niche Construction 
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The heuristic defence is effective against sceptics who would rather eliminate the language 
of niche construction from the evolutionary lexicon. Radicals simply highlight the volume of 
insightful empirical research that has been inspired by the niche construction perspective 
(see Feldman et al 2017). It does not matter if similar insights might have been reached via 
approaches that eschew the term ‘niche construction’, and which are not so closely aligned 
with the EES. These include approaches based on indirect genetic effects (e.g. Wolf et al 
1998), and ‘eco-evolutionary dynamics’ (e.g. Pelletier et al 2009). The fruitfulness of the 
niche construction perspective requires only that the insights it has provoked were not 
produced in a different way.10 
 
This defence is genuine, but modest. It does not show that the niche construction approach 
is more productive overall than alternative approaches to understanding organism-
environment interactions. Hence it does not give strong reasons for mainstream 
evolutionists to switch towards niche construction. Recall, though, that this may not be 
among the radicals’ goals. Laland’s (2018) priority, for example, is to make a case for the 
ongoing productivity of the EES framework, but not in a manner that advocates closing 
down approaches that are more closely aligned with the MS.  
 
There is a further limitation. We do not show that evolutionary theory’s basic explanatory 
structures need to be revised simply by showing that several researchers have found that 
                                                        
10 Unpublished work by Laurel Fogarty, presented at the Evolution Evolving conference in 
Cambridge in April 2019, indicates a series of novel insights that derive from niche 
construction models as compared with models of indirect genetic effects. 
 21 
the niche-construction perspective offers fruitful insights. To achieve the more radical 
revisionary task it is necessary to show not merely that the notion of niche-construction has 
been inspiring for some researchers, but that it brings with it deep changes to the structure 
of the more dominant approach. One might argue, for example, that the heuristic value of 
the niche-construction perspective is explained by the more perspicacious manner in which 
those who use it represent underlying evolutionary processes. This is why the radicals tend 
to move beyond the simple heuristic defence, to focus on how niche-construction is 
conceptualised. 
 
Niche Construction as Phenomenon and Process 
 
In response to Gupta et al’s (2017) polemic against niche-construction, the champions of 
niche construction have re-asserted that it was never their intention to suggest that past 
evolutionists had neglected organismic influences on environments (Feldman et al 2017). 
Instead, they argue that in addition to recognising the phenomena of niche construction—
which they acknowledge have been a staple of evolutionary study ever since Darwin’s work 
on earthworms—an extended synthesis must include niche construction as an evolutionary 
process. 
 
This aspect of the debate may seem puzzling. Niche construction is obviously a process, in 
the banal sense that specific instances of it—the creation of dams by beavers, the building 
of bowers by bowerbirds—consist in events sequenced over time. These events are also of 
uncontroversial evolutionary importance, in the equally banal sense that they have impacts 
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on the compositions of populations over several generations (Okasha 2005). Why, then, 
would anyone deny that niche construction is an evolutionary process? 
 
The answer (in some cases, at least) is that accretionists have a particular, and demanding, 
criterion in mind for what is to count as an evolutionary process. They do not deny that 
organisms’ modifications of their environments cause changes in the composition of 
populations over time. Predation, parasitism, and exogenous changes to physical features of 
environments, cause evolution in the same sense. And yet, these latter series of events do 
not feature in the most basic textbook lists of evolutionary processes alongside selection, 
drift, mutation and migration. Rather, they are ways in which selection (and other genuine 
processes) may come about. Hence Scott-Phillips et al (2014: 1233) argue that the radicals 
are wrong to consider niche construction as an evolutionary process: ‘Environmental change 
is not a “process” of evolution, and, by the same logic, neither is organismic activity…Both 
are instead potential sources of the genetic covariance on which natural selection acts.’  
 
 ‘Direct’ causes of evolution 
 
In response to such sceptical arguments, Laland et al (2017: 2) have claimed that, 
‘Traditionally in population and quantitative genetics, we tend to restrict evolutionary 
processes to those processes that directly change gene frequencies.’ This, they suggest, is 
why accretionists think of selection, but not niche construction, as an evolutionary process. 
They argue that this traditional conception of an evolutionary process should be rejected, 




I doubt that the traditional approach of population genetics truly equates evolutionary 
processes with ‘direct’ causes of gene-frequency change, even though both accretionists 
and radicals have suggested it does. More generally, I argue in this section that it is a 
mistake to use the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ causes as a criterion to 
demarcate genuine from spurious evolutionary processes. It is unclear, for example, 
whether drift is a ‘direct’ cause of trait frequency change. Even so, drift more or less always 
features on basic textbook lists of evolutionary factors, forces or processes. Some have 
argued that drift is not properly understood as a cause at all (e.g. Walsh et al 2002). Instead, 
they say, it is deviation from expected outcome, as predicted by fitness values. Those who 
do consider drift to be a cause tend to do so on the basis that the intensity of drift is 
inversely proportional to the size—strictly speaking the effective size—of a population. 
Hence we can intervene on the strength of drift, in a way that makes predictable differences 
to a population’s later composition (Reisman and Forber 2005). This population-level 
conception hardly credits drift with the most ‘direct’ causal role in changing populations, 
even if it may give drift a causal role of some kind. The token organism-environment 
interactions that result in some kinds of individuals having lesser reproductive success than 
fitness values would lead us to expect—such as those lightning strikes that happen to 
decimate the healthiest in a population—are more ‘direct’ causes of the evolutionary 
changes attributed to drift. 
 
Turning to the supposedly ‘direct’ causal role of selection, consider again a genetic mutation 
that increases the speed with which an organism arrives at reproductive maturity. Such a 
mutation could be favoured by selection. In this kind of scenario, the ‘direct’ causes of the 
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mutation’s spread through the population presumably include the developmental changes 
that increase speed of maturation. They may also include the increased number of mating 
events that the organism undergoes, and the increased number of births that occur over the 
life of the organism. Walsh (2015) draws the conclusion that far from being a direct cause of 
population change, selection is instead a statistical summary of a series of effects going on 
across the population in the lives of individual organisms. On his view, the ‘direct cause’ 
criterion is too strong, because it excludes selection itself from any list of basic evolutionary 
processes. 
 
Even if we disagreed with these arguments derived from Walsh, and attempted to hold onto 
the view that the genuine evolutionary processes are those that involve ‘direct’ changes of 
trait frequency change, it would be hard to see what would enable the asymmetrical verdict 
that selection is a ‘direct’ cause, but niche construction is not. The mode of construction of a 
beaver’s dam determines the beaver’s success in avoiding predation, hence in producing 
offspring: this is a case of niche construction. The speed of maturation determines the onset 
of an organism’s first brood, hence overall reproductive output: this is a case of natural 
selection. Suppose we argue that natural selection is a ‘direct’ cause of trait frequency 
change in the speedy maturation example, simply on the grounds that ‘selection’ names a 
set of causal processes that make the population change its constitution. On this sort of 
view, niche construction is also a direct cause of trait frequency change, for ‘niche 
construction’ also names a set of causal processes that make the constitution of the 
population likely to change.  
 
Resolving the Process Debate 
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Natural selection is typically characterised in a highly abstract way that encompasses all 
cases where there are fitness differences between variants, including when those 
differences are the upshots of organisms influencing their environments. This means that 
niche-construction is often an instance of natural selection, rather than a general 
evolutionary process to be contrasted with natural selection.11 
 
In this section I argue that this does not mean we should side with Scott-Phillips et al (2014) 
in rejecting talk of niche construction as an evolutionary process. I do so by drawing on 
parallels with sexual selection. Fisher (1915) argued for the distinctive character of runaway 
sexual selection by pointing to a reinforcing feedback mechanism between sexual 
preference and ornamentation. The form of selection at work is reflected in expected 
reproductive output, hence sexual selection is a type of natural selection when the latter is 
construed in abstract terms (Gayon 2010). Even so, runaway sexual selection is an 
illuminating instance of an evolutionary process. Attempts to deny that niche-construction 
should count as an evolutionary process, if they simply point to a more abstract 
encompassing role for natural selection, prove too much. That is because they also show 
that runaway sexual selection is not an evolutionary process. 
 
In the previous section I argued that whether something is to count as an evolutionary 
process should not depend on whether it is a ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ cause of change. Nor 
                                                        
11 The discussion of adaptation in section five of this paper includes an example where 
niche-construction is rightly understood as an alternative to selection. 
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should it depend on whether it gives us one of the most abstract ways of thinking about 
how populations change. Instead it depends on the advantages from the point of view of 
investigation, modelling and so forth of making generalisations that unite a given class of 
events. Runaway sexual selection counts as an evolutionary process because invoking it 
allows us to explain, via a specific set of models, the appearance of traits that would 
otherwise be puzzling. 
 
Futuyma—an accretionist—has likewise pointed out that biologists find it useful to think of 
kin selection, linkage disequilibrium and Red Queen effects as evolutionary processes. He 
suggests, in line with the analysis offered here, that there is little to be gained by trying to 
determine which are ‘core’ processes. Even so, he immediately adds that, ‘none of these 
seems to be as fundamental and comprehensive as mutation, genetic drift, gene flow and 
natural selection’ (2017: 4). I have suggested that even if natural selection is more 
‘fundamental’ than sexual selection, in the sense of being a higher-order abstraction that 
encompasses the latter, it does not follow that we have no good reasons for looking in 
detail at the specifics of sexual selection, understood as an evolutionary process in its own 
right. The same, I suggest, goes for niche-construction. We need not squabble over whether 
it is ‘fundamental’. The better question to ask is whether it is important, in the sense that 
models of niche construction allow us to shed light on phenomena that would otherwise go 
unseen, or remain unexplained. This is a deflationary approach to niche-construction, which 
suggests a form of compromise between EES radicals and accretionists.  
 
Fisherian runaway sexual selection merits being described as an evolutionary process 
because of the manner in which a set of events linked by positive feedback help to explain 
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why selective pressures that might seem opposed to good health and survival can become 
entrenched and accentuated over time. EES radicals have argued for a similar justification 
for drawing sets of events together under the heading of ‘niche construction’. They point to 
trans-generational feedback cycles between causal influences over environmental features, 
selection pressures, and plastic reactions to environments that are tuned over development 
time. They argue that these sub-processes can establish selective regimes with greater 
stability than would be naively expected (Odling-Smee et al 2003; Laland et al 2017). This is 
not the place to examine these models in detail. My claim is simply that this pragmatic 
strategy is the right one to use if niche construction is to be established as an evolutionary 
process. More precisely, since different forms of niche-construction might be shown, via 
modelling, to have different characteristic evolutionary effects, we might establish niche 




Perhaps the most significant element of the EES debate concerns natural selection and the 
explanation of adaptation. Accretionists like Charlesworth et al (2017: 10) claim that, ‘allele 
frequency change caused by natural selection is the only credible process underlying the 
evolution of adaptive organismal traits’. Meanwhile radicals such as Laland et al (2015: 6) 
are more pluralist: ‘the burden of creativity in evolution (i.e. the generation of adaptation) 
does not rest on selection alone.’ One camp says selection is the only process that explains 
adaptation. The other says there are several. 
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We will now see that there are comparatively mild and strong interpretations of Laland et 
al’s claim. Milder readings tell us that there are explanatory questions that relate to 
adaptation that are not answered by appeal to selection. Stronger readings tell us that there 
are instances of adaptations that are not the products of selection at all. EES radicals often 
endorse all of these interpretations.  
 
Enriching explanatory contrasts 
 
As a preliminary to introducing the milder readings of Laland et al’s claim that creativity 
does not rest solely on selection, it is useful to remember that explanatory questions are 
typically contrastive (Lipton 2004). Different contrasts make different responses 
explanatorily appropriate. If we ask why a famine occurred in Africa rather than in Europe, it 
might be reasonable to cite drought. If we ask why that same famine occurred in Africa 
rather than in India, we might need to give a different answer based on effective disaster 
relief. 
 
Now suppose we are asking questions about peppered moths. If we ask why the melanic 
form, rather than the lighter form, persists in the woods of Derbyshire, then a good answer 
appeals to cycles of natural selection acting on genetic variation. But we can also ask why 
these moths evolved camouflage, rather than shooting noxious chemicals at the birds. It is 
likely that the right answer will appeal to the far greater developmental accessibility of 
cryptic phenotypes. These kinds of questions point us in the direction of explanations that 
show why the range of variation on offer to selection tends to facilitate one adaptive 
pathway, while closing off others (see Marchini et al 2017, Huneman 2017). They may 
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sometimes be answered by appeal to developmental processes specific to certain taxa, 
sometimes by appeal to general thermodynamic properties of organic materials: hence, 
‘Developmental processes…share with natural selection some responsibility for the 
direction and rate of evolution’ (Laland et al 2015: 2). 
 
Interpreted in this way, Laland et al’s claim that ‘the burden of creativity in evolution (i.e. 
the generation of adaptation) does not rest on selection alone’ is compatible with 
Charlesworth et al’s conviction that natural selection ‘underlies’ the evolution of all adaptive 
phenotypes. This comparatively mild interpretation does not deny, for example, that the 
mutational and phenotypic changes on which selection acts are ‘random’ with respect to 
fitness. Instead, it reminds us of the rich range of explanatory questions we can ask about 
adaptive phenotypes, and of the rich range of resources we may need to turn to in order to 
answer them. Much of Müller’s (2017) case for extension can be understood as a demand 
for a broader set of explanatory contrasts that we might entertain when we ask why we see 




There are stronger readings of Laland et al’s contention that the explanation of adaptation 
outstrips selection. They argue that some elements of adaptive fit between phenotype and 
environment are not the result of selection acting on gradual variation over several 
generations: here they come into genuine conflict with accretionists. 
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Charlesworth et al (2017) explicitly exclude cultural evolution from their discussion of 
selection and adaptation. Even so, if we consider individual organisms that have the 
capacity to learn during their lifetimes, then we find uncontroversial examples that illustrate 
Laland et al’s broader idea. Trial and error learning can enable an individual organism to 
acquire the capacity to deal with an environmental challenge—perhaps the arrival of a new 
kind of predator—that has never been encountered by the population in the past. That is to 
say, the capacity acquired by our focal organism—in this case we imagine it to be the ability 
to fend off a predator never before encountered by the species in question—need not be 
the developmental expression of earlier selection for the very same capacity in the past. The 
individual might then transmit this new-found capacity to its offspring. In this way, a process 
other than natural selection explains the acquisition of a new adaptive capacity. 
 
The significance of this result should not be exaggerated. Natural selection acting over 
generations may well explain why organisms of the species in question are able to learn by 
trial and error in the first place. Selection need not be irrelevant, then, if we are to 
understand the origin of the underlying capacity that explains how the species we are 
contemplating becomes able to evade these new predators. Selection may also have 
equipped the species with various learning heuristics, and even with some innate 
knowledge regarding predators similar to our novel one. Even so, at least part of the answer 
to the question, ‘How is it that this particular organism, and subsequent individuals 
influenced by it, were able to evade this new predator?’, points to the process of learning as 
carried out over developmental time. Learning also demonstrates how niche-construction 
may sometimes constitute a straightforward alternative to selection when it comes to 
understanding the generation of adaptation: a population colonising a very cold 
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environment might develop physiological adaptations over time under the influence of 
selection, or it might learn over a much shorter timespan how to modify its niche—perhaps 
by building shelters—in ways that compensate for the environmental change (Odling-Smee 
et al 2003). Hence Futuyma’s (2017: 1) claim that, ‘Directional or positive natural selection is 
the only known cause of adaptive change’ (emphasis added), only has plausibility if he is 
implicitly excluding developmental processes like trial and error learning from his verdict. 
 
Learning constitutes an illustrative instance of Laland et al’s claim that, ‘…exploratory 
processes, commonplace throughout development, are powerful agents of phenotype 
construction, as they enable highly diverse functional responses that need not have been 
pre-screened by earlier selection’ (2015: 6). One question, on which radicals and 
accretionists disagree, is whether (as accretionists seem willing to concede) learning is the 
only instance of this general pattern or whether (as radicals claim) there are several other 
‘exploratory’ processes, whereby forms of interactive feedback over developmental 
timescales allow the creation of functional phenotypes in response to environmental 




There is a second aspect of stronger versions of Laland et al’s contention that selection does 
not provide the whole story about adaptation. They claim that the phenomenon of 
‘facilitated variation’ helps to explain how it can be that ‘functional responses’—i.e. fitness-
enhancing responses—can be produced which ‘need not have been pre-screened by earlier 
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selection’ (see Gerhart and Kirschner 2007). An elegant form of this type of explanation can 
be found in work by Richard Watson and collaborators. 
 
At the risk of creating confusion, our discussion now turns away from learning as it occurs 
over the life of an individual, and towards learning understood as a source of analogy for 
how we think of selection across multiple generations. It is commonplace to note that 
developmental processes can be modified by natural selection as the gene networks that 
influence those processes evolve. Watson et al’s novel insights are based on their 
contention that ‘gene networks evolve like neural networks learn’ (Watson et al 2014). This 
allows them to apply general lessons from learning theory, derived from theoretical and 
simulational work on neural networks, to evolution by natural selection. In a series of 
publications (e.g. Watson et al 2014, Watson and Szathmary 2016, Watson et al 2016, 
Kouvaris et al 2017), these researchers have used these insights to show why we should 
expect the phenotypic variation available to selection to be more likely to enhance function 
than we might naively think, even when environmental challenges are presented that the 
lineage has not been exposed to in the past.  
 
Watson and collaborators argue that selection acting over multiple generations on gene 
networks is formally equivalent to a learning process in a neural network. This has 
significant impact on how we understand what selection can achieve. They conclude that, 
‘the possibility that evolution can learn from experience to favourably bias future 
exploration need not be any more mysterious than the basic result that learning from a 




In what sense does this form of research challenge the contention of accretionists like 
Futuyma or Charlesworth et al who, to repeat the latter’s credo, hold that ‘allele frequency 
change caused by natural selection is the only credible process underlying the evolution of 
adaptive organismal traits’? There is no suggestion in these elements of Watson’s work that 
a hitherto unrecognised process must be added to evolution by natural selection, which 
supplements or replaces selection in the explanation of adaptation.12 Instead, we simply 
have more cycles of mutation and reproduction, with some variants contributing more to 
future generations than others. Far from Watson and collaborators framing these articles as 
a challenge to selection’s ability to explain complex adaptations, they instead see their work 
as showing precisely how selection is able to explain such adaptations. In their view, 
learning models offer, ‘the potential to better explain how the process of random variation 
and selection results in the apparently intelligent designs it produces.’ 
 
It would be a mistake, though, to suggest that this type of work leaves our basic 
understanding of the explanation of adaptation untouched. Watson and collaborators take 
themselves to have shown that selection processes have a series of capacities that have not 
been well understood: ‘evolution can learn in more sophisticated ways than previously 
realised’ (Watson and Szathmary 2016: 147). They are quite right to say that, ‘In current 
                                                        
12 In work that is not yet published, but which was presented at the Evolution Evolving 
conference in Cambridge, April 2019, Watson has made a case for a process he calls ‘natural 
induction’, which potentially offers a far more significant challenge to the claim that all 
adaptation is explained by cycles of selection. 
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evolutionary theory, it seems impossible that natural selection can anticipate what is 
needed in novel selective environments’ (155); and yet, their use of learning theory gives a 
precise account of the circumstances under which a very specific form of anticipation can 
occur. Accretionists may feel comforted that selection, in these pieces of work at least, 
retains a privileged position with respect to the explanation of adaptation. Radicals should 
also be encouraged by the significant challenge to the familiar affordances that selection 
processes have been credited with. 
 
6. Cross-cutting verdicts on the EES 
 
The most basic point this article has established concerns the exceptionally wide range of 
issues in play in the context of debates over the EES. There are at least three levels to be 
discerned. 
 
First, and most obviously, there are fairly clearly-defined first-order empirical issues. One 
example concerns the extent to which forms of non-genetic inheritance are trans-
generationally stable and widely distributed across many taxa. Second, the questions often 
concern historical matters. Here the topics under discussion include whether the modern 
synthesis is best understood as a series of assumptions or hypotheses that might be shown 
true or false; whether it is better understood as a malleable set of investigative tools, or a 
loose alliance of diverse researchers; and whether the mainstream of work in evolutionary 
theory has shown inflexible constraining tendencies, or whether it has instead shown forms 
of adaptive plasticity in the face of new problems, new data and new techniques. Third, the 
issues at stake are often of a philosophical/conceptual nature. A selection of such questions 
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includes what it takes for something to be an ‘evolutionary process’; whether natural 
selection is the sole explanation of adaptive phenomena; and whether evolutionary theory 
needs to abandon a ‘linear’ conception of biological causation—exemplified by the notion 
that selection is a unidirectional force that moves from environment to organism—and 
should instead adopt a ‘reciprocal’ understanding of causation in terms of various forms of 
feedback and mutual determination. 
 
In pulling out these three dimensions of the EES debate, I do not mean to imply that they 
are independent of each other: indeed, we have seen clearly that they are not. What might 
seem to be an empirical question about the nature of epigenetic inheritance, for example, 
takes on a conceptual dimension when we ask what its significance is for evolutionary 
change. Are we assuming that such an inheritance system must have similar properties to 
the genetic inheritance system, or should we instead consider how systems that are not 
able to perpetuate the inheritance of differences over many generations might be able to 
influence the evolutionary fate of a population in alternative ways? Our discussion of Fisher 
on sexual selection reminds us that what might seem to be a predominantly conceptual 
question about the nature of evolutionary processes takes on a historical dimension when 
we ask to what degree the EES radicals’ understanding of processes truly marks a break 
from what has gone before, in terms of how selection itself is understood. 
 
I do not mean to imply that Laland, Müller, Uller, Pigliucci, Futuyma, or other key actors in 
these debates would be surprised to learn that there are conceptual and historical foci of 
dispute in these debates: indeed, it has been a self-evident theme in their own work. What, 
then, is the value of noting the diversity of themes under discussion in the specific ways 
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highlighted here? It helps to illuminate  the many cross-cutting assessments a well-informed 
biologist might come to when asked to reach a verdict on the EES, and thereby explains why 
that debate is so hard to resolve. Here is a subset: 
 
• One might enthusiastically endorse the significance of non-genetic inheritance for 
modifying evolutionary dynamics, while adding that formal approaches using the 
Price equation give us useful tools for understanding these influences. Here one 
might be a radical at the level of evolutionary hypotheses, but an accretionist at the 
level of analytical tools. 
• One might deny the significance of non-genetic inheritance for evolution, while using 
Watson’s work to argue that evolutionary theorists have not fully appreciated the 
capacity of selection to produce systems with a significant ability to anticipate novel 
environmental challenges. Here one might be accretionist when it comes to the 
hypothesis that natural selection accounts for adaptation, while being more radical 
when it comes to the sorts of tools we need to use to understand selection’s 
capacities. 
• One might argue that niche-construction generates important forms of stabilised 
adaptive trajectories that have not been properly appreciated. Even so, one might 
deny that this makes a case for placing a new notion of ‘reciprocal causation’ at the 
centre of evolutionary theory. One might claim that reciprocal causation has been in 
the mainstream of evolutionary thinking—in models of runaway sexual selection, for 
example—for over a hundred years. 
 
7. What would success look like for the extenders? 
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There are further insights that our atomisation of the EES offers. Once we note how 
elements of radical and accretionist positions can be combined in many ways, we also 
highlight a series of complexities when it comes to spelling out what success for EES radicals 
would look like. 
 
It is possible to imagine a future in which the textbooks that have been used in multiple 
editions for the past forty years are significantly rewritten. Perhaps they will give selection a 
less prominent role in the explanation of adaptation; they might introduce a whole series of 
important modes of inheritance alongside genes; they might consider changes to gene 
frequencies merely as a rather special case of a far more general phenomenon of 
evolutionary change over time; they might place considerable stress on reciprocal causal 
interactions between processes of development, inheritance and selection. Were this to 
happen, it would constitute a signal that a root-and-branch overhaul of evolutionary 
theorising had occurred. 
 
Some advocates of the EES may view success in such terms. Müller, for example, notes a 
series of ‘empirical and conceptual advances’ in the understanding of several different 
evolutionary phenomena, and remarks that it would be surprising if, ‘in the midst of a 
substantial growth of knowledge, the central theory uniting the different fields of biology 




The range of issues under discussion indicates how hard it will be to secure a victory of this 
ambitious sort. The radicals’ positions only receive full endorsement when one is willing to 
agree to many different claims. A small selection include: their empirical assessments of 
epigenetic inheritance; their historiographical stance regarding the nature of the modern 
synthesis and its constraining role; their philosophical positions regarding the status of 
natural selection, the general features of evolutionary processes, and the need to place 
reciprocal causation at the centre of a re-engineered synthesis. This is not all: I have been 
silent in this article on a series of further questions including the notions of genetic 
accommodation and ‘genes as followers’, the value of the proximate/ultimate distinction, 
and the very definition of evolution in terms of changing gene frequencies. As a purely 
tactical matter, it is difficult to convert individuals to a position which, in its full-blooded 
form, demands assent to so many different contested claims, at so many different levels of 
analysis. 
 
It is worth considering, then, a different outcome that would still signal a strong vindication 
of many sub-themes stressed by advocates of the EES. Imagine that a moderately-sized 
community of biological researchers emerges who are explicitly inspired by something they 
jointly call the ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’. (This appears to be what is happening 
right now as a result of research sparked by Laland, Uller, Müller and the many other 
collaborators they have worked with.) They take an interest in each other’s work. They 
regularly produce pieces of empirical and theoretical research that all evolutionary 
thinkers—including those who continue to work within the mainstream—acknowledge to 
be of value. These pieces of ground-level research (as opposed to high-level reflections on 
the general structure of evolutionary theory) might cover wide domains of enquiry. They 
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might use the Price equation to show how forms of inheritance interact. They might 
demonstrate specific ways in which animal choices influence evolutionary trajectories. They 
might uncover new forms of exploratory adaptive feedback, akin to learning, that take place 
during development. They might offer detailed models of specific developmental processes, 
and the ways they affect adaptive pathways followed and not followed. They might yield 
increased understanding of the precise circumstances under which we can expect genetic 
variation to anticipate environmental change. 
 
I have suggested in this paper that there is considerable diversity—even disunity—in the 
themes explored by EES radicals. It might seem that this amounts to an argument for 
abandoning all talk of the EES as such, in favour of more focused attention on a series of 
more tractable, lower-level questions about developmental bias, epigenetic inheritance, 
exploratory developmental processes and so forth. I showed the attractions of such a 
deflationary conclusion when examining the niche-construction debate. There, I 
recommended a pragmatic account that recognises a plurality of overlapping evolutionary 
‘processes’—natural selection, runaway sexual selection, various forms of niche 
construction—whenever we have models that illuminate evolutionary questions in novel 
ways. 
 
If we allowed this deflationary view to eliminate all talk of the EES we would, however, have 
gone too far. The EES becomes more than a mere collection of researchers driving valuable 
work on diverse sub-topics, and instead earns its keep as an integrated programme of 
investigation, when insights from different themes are brought together to inform each 
other. This can happen when researchers start to draw links between work on 
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developmental plasticity and niche construction (e.g. Moczek 2015); when they conjecture 
interactions between work on various forms of developmental bias and evolvability (e.g. 
Uller et al 2018, Duckworth et al 2018, Badyaev et al 2019); when they explore the links 
between evolutionary rationales for adaptive plasticity and the origins of forms of non-
genetic inheritance (e.g. English et al 2015); and when they use insights from connectionist 
models of learning to shed light on mutual interactions between the capacities of selection 
and the organisation of the systems that comprise evolving populations (e.g. Watson et al 
2016). Even when this happens, the very malleability of the tools we use for evolutionary 
enquiry offers accretionists multiple ways to accommodate—and even to co-opt—insights 
and approaches generated by those working under the banner of the EES. These are 
victories for the EES as such, for they are victories that are the distinctive product of a 
coming-together of researchers working on the themes stressed by EES researchers. But 
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